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For Richard Rorty, since Plato the history of Western
philosophy has been deeply, comprehensively rooted in
mirror-imagery, which is the attempt to discover the foundation
of knowledge by means of accurate representations of reality.
Philosophers have paid attention to the issues of eternity and
certainty, and thus the primary business of philosophy has been
considered to offer systemic, constructive theories of
representation in order to guarantee the certainty of our
knowledge about nature. In his masterful work, Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature, Rorty argues that Western philosophy is
obsessed with the impossible task of obtaining knowledge
through accurate representations, and then suggests knowledge
as social practice through participating in a conversation, which
makes it possible for us to escape from that obsession. He thus
proposes a “therapeutic,” “edifying” philosophy rather than a
“systemic,” “constructive” philosophy (5). Rorty sees edifying
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philosophy as a philosophy, which not only keeps us from the
delusion of the unchallengeable truth for which Western
philosophy has relentlessly tried to search but also enables us to
participate in a conversation.
This book is divided into three parts. Part I, “Our Glassy
Essence,” deals with the problematic dualism between mind and
body. For Rorty, Descartes “invented” the mind as a mirror that
reflects reality, and brought “the mirror-imagery,” which is “the
original sin of epistemology” (60). Rorty acknowledges that
Descartes was to make it possible for Kant to develop an
epistemology which replaced scholasticism, and thus his
invention of the mind brought a “new ground” that provided a
“field of inquiry” where the possibility of certainty would be
found (136, 262). In this regard, philosophy as epistemology
culminated in Kant who conceived the purpose of philosophy as
the attempt to construct a systematic knowledge of all
knowledge by means of “the Principles of the Pure
Understanding” which the mind set up for itself. In Part II,
“Mirroring,” Rorty criticizes epistemology and calls into question
several “successor subjects” to epistemology such as philosophical
psychology, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of
science. In agreement with both Wilfrid Sellars’s attack on the
myth of “givenness” and Williad V. O. Quine’s attack on
“necessity” and the analytic-synthetic distinction, Rorty develops
pragmatism that lets us consider “truth” as “what it is better for
us to believe” rather than as “the accurate representation of
realty” (10). In Part III, “Philosophy,” Rorty generalizes Thomas
Kuhn’s distinction between normal science and abnormal one. He
likens epistemology centered in the tradition of Western
philosophy to normal discourse. Just as traditional philosophy
attempts to explain “rationality” and “objectivity” through
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conditions of accurate representation, normal discourse is
“conducted within an agreed-upon set of conventions about what
counts as a relevant contribution” by means of “agreed-upon
criteria for reaching agreement” (11, 320).
In opposition to this epistemological tradition whose
purpose is the attainment of knowledge, Rorty proposes
hermeneutics as edifications of descriptions which aims to make
sense of “what is going on at a stage where we are still too
unsure about it to describe it” (321). From the hermeneutical
point of view, knowledge is understood as a matter of social
practice: “we understand knowledge when we understand the
social justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it as
accuracy of representation” (170). Rorty appreciates edifying
philosophy, which not only prevents conversations from lapsing
into “inquiry” or “a research program” but also enables to the
continuing of conversations (372-73). The social practice takes
place in a conversation and “the hope of agreement is never lost
so long as the conversation lasts” (318). Consequently, for
Rorty, edifying philosophy is an “expression of hope” for
agreement among interlocutors who participate in conversations.
Though Rorty reiterates the necessity of a conversation in
order to accomplish the hope for agreement, he does not say
much about how to make a conversation in a concrete situation.
His taciturnity makes his argument on the possibility of a
conversation theoretical and optimistic. His theoretical view on a
conversation is not irrelevant to his misunderstanding—or
neglecting—of one of the most crucial features of existentialism:
an active movement rather than a reactive one. Rorty explains
existentialism by contrasting between systematic and edifying
philosophies:
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“Existentialism” is an intrinsically reactive movement of
thought, one which has point only in opposition to the
tradition. I want now to generalize this contrast between
philosophers whose work is essentially constructive and those
whose work is essentially reactive. I shall thereby develop a
contrast between philosophy which centers in epistemology
and the sort of philosophy which takes its point of departure
from suspicion about the pretensions of epistemology. This is
the contrast between “systematic” and “edifying” philosophies
(366).
Rorty sees existentialism as “intrinsically reactive
movement,” which is always “in opposition to the tradition.” He
then attempts to extend the contrast between existentialism and
the tradition to the contrast between edifying philosophies and
systematic ones. Like edifying philosophy, for Rorty,
existentialism is “intrinsically reactive,” and the tradition is
required to be reacted; thus, existentialism is the outcome of a
reaction against the tradition. He goes on to even argue that
edifying philosophers, including existentialists, know “their work
loses its point when the period they were reacting against is
over” (369). However, existentialism primarily focuses on
personal, existential life regardless of its tradition.
Existentialism seeks valuable meaningfulness of subjectivity as a
way of the fullest expression of an individual life. What is at
stake to existentialists is not to react against the tradition but
to create and find the meaning of a personal life. Insofar as any
attempt to escape from the tradition is based on a reactive
movement, it would still remain in the domination of the
tradition. Their work thus never loses “its point” as long as they
focus on the meaning of personal life. In this sense, an
existential movement is not a reactive action, the attempt to
escape from the domination of the tradition, but rather an active
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action, the effort to engage in the activity to fully express and
create an individual life whatever the tradition is “out there.”
The one and only thing existentialists are worried about is the
danger of reduction of subjectivity to objectivity, which
undermines the distinctive meaning and value of an existential
life.
In addition, unconditional opposition to the tradition does
not result in guaranteeing subjectivity as Rorty conceives;
rather, the subjectivity can be secured through seeking the
meaning of a concrete personal life. The existential meaning of
subjectivity can be gained neither by following the tradition nor
by reacting against it but by affirming personal existence. It
seems that Rorty’s aversion to the tradition drives him to focus
on the theoretical aspect of existentialism. Hence, he seems to
overlook the “existential” aspect of existentialism; in fact, there
are no other aspects in existentialism other than existential one.
If Rorty wants to adopt existentialism in order to formulate
edifying philosophy—for him, existentialism is a generalized
philosophy of edifying philosophy (378)—then he should have
paid attention to the active movement of existentialism rather
than the reactive one. Otherwise, existentialism cannot be
compatible with edifying philosophy. As long as existential life is
neglected, edifying philosophy would be nothing but a theoretical
endeavor.
In spite of the fact that Rorty calls into question the
traditional understanding of truth and knowledge by means of
accurate representation, which seemingly guarantees the fixed,
unchangeable truth, he does not disapprove of the possibility of
truth itself. He acknowledges truth insofar as it is understood
pragmatically. In other words, for Rorty, truth is something not
perennial due to the accurate representation of nature but
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“edifying” according to, as William James says, “What it is better
for us to believe.” Rorty says that edifying philosophy allows us
to “keep the conversation going rather than to find objective
truth” and to “protest against attempts to close off conversation
by proposals for universal commensuration through the
hypostatization of some privileged set of descriptions” (377). As
long as the conversation persists, as he points out, the hope of
agreement will never vanish. Rorty, of course, accepts a possible
disagreement, which is “exciting” and “fruitful,” because it will
finally be “compromised or transcended in the course of the
conversation” (317-18). What is at stake here is how we can
compromise among different interlocutors who are participating
in a concrete conversation.
Interlocutors in a concrete conversation are not free from
power relations; hence, a conversation is not conducted among
“power-free” participants. Rather, they have different and
hierarchical positions in terms of politics, economics, religion and
culture. In this situation, the conversation cannot equally reflect
their positions and opinions like an unclouded mirror. Hence,
the conversation can be dominated and controlled by the
dominant while the marginalized are isolated from it. Whereas,
for the former, the conversation would be “exiting” and “fruitful”
because it can be merely a means to accomplish their own
purposes in the name of a fare dialogue, for the latter, the
conversation is no longer dialogue but rather monologue where
their identities and subjectivities are subsumed under a pretend
conversation; in fact, even though they are participating in a
conversation, there would be no their voices in it. For the
marginalized, a conversation is “drudgery” and even “lethal” in
the sense that it can become a solipsistic monologue, privileging
specific stances, in the disguise of a dialogue.
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However, Rorty’s focus on the outcome of a conversation,
which promises the optimistic agreement of mankind, makes him
belittle the conditions for a concrete conversation. He seems to
conceive a conversation as an unclouded mirror that can not
only equally reflect participants’ different positions but also
produce a rosy agreement among them, just as epistemology
attempts to find the foundation of knowledge through an
unclouded mirror as accurate representation that Rorty criticizes.
A monologue in the disguise of a dialogue entails a covert tone
of oppression and a potential for violence, and such dialogue
cannot be free of suspicion that it serves a hidden imperialistic
purpose. What is important here is “who” are participating in the
conversation since they actually constitute the conversation itself
in a concrete situation. In this sense, the conversation is not an
unclouded and solid mirror, which can always accurately reflect
every participant’s position but a clouded and vulnerable one,
which can be distorted and even broken at any time. In order to
guarantee a conversation, ironically, it is crucial to recognize the
vulnerability of a conversation.
Though Rorty’s focus on the outcome of a conversation
entails not only his lack of consideration of the conditions for a
conversation but also his optimistic and theoretical views on a
conversation, I do not intend to criticize the possibility of a
conversation itself that Rorty proposes. As Rorty notes, this
book is “no more than a prolegomenon” (390). What I want to do
is to make it more pragmatic in order to have a conversation in
a concrete situation. A conversation in the first place is neither
given nor guaranteed; rather, it is vulnerable at any time. In
order to make it dialogical not monological, we need to realize
how vulnerable a conversation is like a fragile mirror. The
vulnerability of a conversation does not reveal that there is no
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chance to have a potential that gives hope for agreement.
Instead, its vulnerability leads us to focus on the conditions for
a conversation that actually give us a chance of a possible
conversation in a concrete situation.
